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INTRODUCTION
Stripped of the rhetoric, this case turns on two key questions: (1) was there a
reasonable probability that Fairfax could have sold or refinanced the Mall for $16 million
prior to the July 1994 expiration of the Chemical Bank loan, and, if so, (2) was Fairfax's
determination that the REIT was the only reasonable alternative to foreclosure so reckless
or malicious as to justify, not only an award of punitive damages, but an award that is
presumptively excessive under Utah law. Applying the relevant standards of review to
these questions requires a negative answer to both.
First, even with the deferential standard of review following the jury's verdict in
favor of the Smiths, as a matter of law, the Smiths failed to meet their burden of proof on
liability with respect to causation.1 It is undisputed that Chemical Bank sent a notice of
default on the loan in July 1993 and, if not for the REIT, it would not have extended the
loan. The Smiths point to no contrary evidence. On the issue of whether there was any
alternative to avoid foreclosure other than the REIT, the Smiths' sole evidence was the
testimony of their appraiser, Howden, that as of January 1, 1994, he thought the Mall
property could be sold for $16 million if left on the market for one year. But since a year
was not available to the Partnerships, Howden's testimony is not evidence of a reasonable
probability that a sale would have occurred before foreclosure. Without a showing of a

The Smiths erroneously contend that Fairfax has not appealed the sufficiency of the
evidence on liability. Fairfax has clearly raised (what the Smiths call) the '"bankruptcy
or REIT' defense" as to both compensatory and punitive liability on appeal. (Fairfax
Br. at 25-28, 30-34; see also id. at 25-26 n.34 ("If the REIT was the only available
alternative, then the Smiths' claims would fail on several related grounds," including
causation, proof of damages, and breach of duty.)
l

reasonable alternative to save the Mall, as a matter of law, the Smiths cannot establish
that Fairfax's conduct proximately caused any damage.
Second, there was insufficient evidence to submit punitive damages to the jury,
much less to support a presumptively excessive award. This Court reviews punitive
damages de novo, both for due process issues as well as under the Crookston I factors. A
de novo review of the entire record reveals no basis for a finding of malice. Because the
standard of review is de novo, the Smiths' brief should have addressed the entire record.
Instead it largely ignores the evidence in the record against punitive damages.
Significantly, neither the Smiths' brief nor the District Court's findings even addresses
Fairfax's belief (right or wrong) that the REIT was the only viable alternative. In
addition, the Smiths spend much of their brief emphasizing conduct that is clearly
unrelated to the REIT decision and for which they assert no injury or damages, e.g.,
combining Partnership accounts, accruing (but never paying) interest on Fairfax's capital
call contribution, following the advice of Fairfax's tax accountant on tax allocations to
the partners, and John Price's profits from the contribution of over seventy other
unrelated properties to the REIT. Such conduct, even if correctly described by the Smiths
(which it is not), is not relevant to liability or the damages in this case.
Third, the District Court erred in allowing the jury to award prejudgment interest
as "damages," contrary to almost a century of Utah precedent. The jury's excessive
award of interest in this case demonstrates the wisdom of that precedent.

2

REPLY ARGUMENTS2
I.

BECAUSE FAIRFAX'S REIT DECISION WAS THE ONLY
REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE TO AVOID FORECLOSURE,
FAIRFAX'S ACTIONS DID NOT CAUSE THE SMITHS ANY INJURY.
A.

Preservation of Issue for Appeal.

The Smiths argue that Fairfax did not raise "causation" at trial. (Smiths' Br. at
46.) To the contrary, Fairfax repeatedly argued below that (what the Smiths call) its
"bankruptcy or REIT" defense limited possible damages to REIT value (which the
Smiths did not contest), rather than appraised fair market value. This is the very
causation issue raised here on appeal.

The Smiths make the shopworn argument that Fairfax failed to marshal the facts,
notwithstanding the twenty pages devoted to the facts in Fairfax's brief. (Smiths' Br. at
2, 26-28.) But the Smiths do not identify any specific material "fact" that Fairfax
omitted. Instead, the Smiths identify only two omitted "core issues" (the "consent" and
"valuation" issues) (Smiths' Br. at 3, 12), both of which were in fact described by
Fairfax. (Fairfax Br. at 10 n.5, 14 n.21, 15 n.23.) The Smiths also assert that Fairfax
"phrased deceptively" and insincerely]" the evidence. (Smiths' Br. at 26, n.6.)
However, the examples cited by the Smiths show that Fairfax was characterizing
disputed evidence at trial but properly setting forth the Smiths' version of the facts.
Fairfax unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment (and in limine) on damages,
arguing that the REIT was the only available alternative to avoid a "total loss" of the
Mall, which limited damages to a REIT valuation rather than an appraised valuation.
(See, e.g., R 3117-18 ("If the jury concludes that the property was sold for a proper
value under REIT practices and standards, then the [Smiths] were not damaged"); 3130
("The question of damage must be considered in light of the fact that the REIT was the
only available alternative to avoid a total loss of the property"); see also R 1729, 173334, 1737-38, 1927, 3755, 3756, 3762, 4538 at 7, 10, 56.) During trial, Fairfax made the
same argument on directed verdict (R 4545 at 1003; R 4550 at 2034), in opposition to
the Smiths' motion as to the measure of damages (R 4546 at 1197), and in objection to
the jury instruction that took REIT valuation from the jury (R 4551 at 2132, 2138,
2141-42). After trial, Fairfax moved for judgment or a new trial, again arguing that the
REIT was the only way "to avoid total loss," which should have limited the Smiths'
measure of damages, if any, to REIT valuation (R 3755-56, 3759, 3762-64, 3807-10).
3

B.

Causation and Damages Require Proof of a Reasonable Probability or
Certainty that the Smiths Could Have Sold the Mall for Full Value
Prior to July 1994.

In its initial brief, Fairfax argued that, as a matter of law, the Smiths had the
burden to show a "reasonable probability]" of selling the Mall for $16 million prior to
foreclosure to establish proximate causation under Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, ^38,
990 P.2d 933. In response, the Smiths argue that Mahmood dealt with "consequential"
rather than "general" damages. That distinction, however, is immaterial because proof of
proximate causation is required for both general and consequential damages. Indeed,
Mahmood derived its standard from general causation principles. Id., at ^22 (quoting
Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, Inc., 132 P.2d 680, 683 (Utah 1943)); see also Highland
Constr. Co. v. Union Pac. RR. Co., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984) ("whether general or
special, damages must be traceable to the wrongs complained o f ) .
The Smiths also argue that Fairfax confuses "injury" with "damage." (Smiths' Br.
at 48-49.) But the injury/damage distinction urged by the Smiths is also immaterial
because, even under a damages analysis, the Smiths must still establish the "fact of
damage" with a "reasonable certainty" or "probability." See Mahmood, 1999 UT 104,
1J20; see also Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co., 722 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1986) ("fact of
damages must be proven with reasonable certainty"); Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain
State Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330, 336 (Utah 1985) ("The evidence must. . . give rise
to a reasonable probability that the plaintiff suffered damage as a result of the breach").

C.

The Smiths Did Not Prove that There Was a Reasonable Probability or
Certainty of Any Recovery But for the REIT.

The key causation issue at trial, on which the Smiths had the burden of proof, was
whether there was any reasonable alternative to avoid foreclosure other than the REIT.
The Smiths claim that the Mall was not "headed toward foreclosure" because of the
Mall's good occupancy and financial performance. (Smiths' Br., K 3 at 5-6.) The Smiths
miss the point—the Mall faced foreclosure and bankruptcy not due to low tenancy or
poor performance but because of the undisputed impending loan default unless either
extended, refinanced, or paid by sale of the Mall. There was no reasonable prospect of
such extension, refinancing, or sale prior to default.
1.

Fairfax Could Not Extend or Refinance the Chemical Bank
Loan.

The evidence showed that Chemical Bank would not have extended the loan for a
seventh time beyond July 1994. Indeed, it was undisputed that Chemical Bank (1) issued
a notice of default in July 1993,4 (2) granted the sixth extension solely to complete the
REIT, (3) refused additional extensions, and (4) changed its internal policies to "get
[loans] off the books" because the financing market had "evaporated." (Fairfax Br. at 8
n.13.)
The Smiths offered no evidence that the Partnerships could have refinanced the
Mall prior to July 1994. The undisputed evidence was that Fairfax had used two national
brokers to attempt to refinance the Mall since 1988 (with only one offer to refinance at

one-half the loan balance) and was told by its second broker that he had "exhausted" his
efforts and "it would be very difficult" to refinance any amount over $9 million, let alone
the $12 million needed.5 (Smiths' Br., If 5 at 7; see also Fairfax Br. at 6-7, n.12.)
2.

Fairfax Made Extensive Efforts to Sell the Mall.

In addition to the refinancing efforts, it was undisputed that Fairfax also had
unsuccessfully tried to sell the Mall for years.6 (Fairfax Br. at 7.) Fairfax's broker
testified that by 1993 he had "exhausted all the avenues and there was basically no one
interested in buying the property." (Id. n.12 (quoting R 4548 at 1603-05).) Nevertheless,
Fairfax continued its own efforts (including asking the Smiths to find a buyer)7 until the
REIT closed. (R 4550 at 1914, 1929.) The Smiths concede they were told in December

4

The Smiths state that the loan was not in "default" on September 23, 1993, the date of
the last extension. (Smiths' Br. at 6.) However, that fact means nothing since by that
date Chemical Bank had agreed to one last extension to complete the REIT.

5

The Smiths erroneously claim Mr. Oliver's refinancing attempts were "[ijnvariably" a
"package deal" with other malls. (Smiths' Br., 1j 5 at 7.) In fact, Oliver said he initially
packaged the Mall with "better" properties to improve the Mall's chances (R 4548 at
1595-96, 1598), but he also tried to market the Mall "by itself (id. at 1599).

6

The Smiths claim Mr. Oliver "was not even retained to find a potential buyer," but the
Smiths omit key portions of Mr. Oliver's testimony. (Smiths' Br. at 7.) He actually
said "[w]hen we were first retained, the objective was to . . . to refinance the loan . . . .
But the agreement was left open and there was an understanding to look for other
alternatives. As we saw that financing was very> difficult. . . we also looked at other
alternatives such as . . . selling the property'." (R 4548 at 1615) (emphasis added).)

7

The Smiths argue that Fairfax's request for their help occurred in December lc>93, but
"astonishingly] . . . did not disclose . . . that the Mall had already been contributed to
the REIT." (Smiths'Br. at 37.) The Smiths are wrong. The December 1993 letter
clearly stated that Fairfax's request for the Smiths' help had been made "some time
ago." (Fairfax Br. at 13 (quoting P-65).) Moreover, although the Contribution
Agreement was signed prior to December 1993, it was conditioned on the REIT
closing, so that the Mall had not yet been conveyed to the REIT. (Id. at 11 (citing P-58,
P-59).)
6

1993 that Fairfax's efforts to sell or refinance had failed. (Smiths' Br. at 45; Fairfax Br.
at 13 (quoting P-65).)
3.

The Smiths Submitted No Evidence that the Mall Could Have
Been Sold Prior to Foreclosure.

There was no evidence presented to the jury from which it could have found that
the Mall could have been sold for $16 million prior to the foreclosure date. The Smiths'
only evidence on this point was the testimony of an appraiser (Howden) that "a willing
buyer would have paid $16,000,000 for the [Mall] as of January 1, 1994." (Smiths' Br., ^
7 at 8.) But Howden himself did not testify that the Mall could have been sold for $16
million under the actual circumstances faced by Fairfax. Indeed, Howden expressly
premised his opinion on the condition that the Mall "remained on the market in 1994 for
a period of approximately one year" where Fairfax was not "compelled" to sell. (R 4543
at 673; see also Smiths' Br. at 47-48.) The undisputed evidence, however, shows that the
Mall could not have remained on the market for a year. By July 1993 Fairfax had already
received a notice of default, which (even with the full extension) would have expired in
half that time. In fact, in the absence of the REIT, the Partnerships were already in the
position of being compelled by Chemical Bank to sell as of January 1994—the date of
Howden's valuation. In any event, even if Howden had testified that the Mall could have
been sold before July 1994 (which he did not), his opinion would have been sheer

7

speculation because he was uninformed about the history of prior unsuccessful attempts
to refinance or sell the Mall.8 (R 4543 at 670-74.)
The Smiths did not prove a reasonable probability or certainty (for proximate cause
and damages purposes) that the Mall could have been sold for $16 million (or even at all) by
July 1994 if it had not been contributed to the REIT. In Mahmood, this Court rejected
causation as speculative as a matter of law where there was no evidence of any actual
attempt to refinance property prior to foreclosure. Mahmood, 1999 UT, ^j 28. In the present
case, Fairfax exhausted its efforts to sell or refinance the Mall, the Smiths never responded
to Fairfax's request that they find a buyer, and the Smiths did not contest the reasonableness
of Fairfax's efforts. Under these circumstances, the "probabilities" that the Mall would not
have been sold for $16 million before July 1994 are "equally or more potent" than the
probabilities that it would be so sold. Thus, the Smiths' "deductions are mere guesses and
the jury should not [have] be[en] permitted to speculate."9 Id.,^1 22. The District Court thus
erred in denying Fairfax's "bankruptcy or REIT" defense.

Howden in fact testified that, given the market, he believed the "Mall [could have]
obtained a long-term financing commitment or . . . loan in the early 1990s" (Fairfax Br.
at 7 nn. 10, 12 (citing R 4543 at 672; 4548 at 1604)), the very time when a national
broker had unsuccessfully but exhaustively attempted to refinance the Mall. Howden
and the Smiths made no attempt to question these actual efforts.
9

The Smiths call Fairfax's argument that it had no option other than the REIT to avoid
foreclosure an "absolute falsehood." (Smiths' Br. at 41 n.l 1.) In addition to
speculating that the Mall could have been sold, the Smiths claim that Fairfax should
have obtained their consent. The Smiths also suggest that Fairfax could have waited
until July 1994 to make its decision. Moreover, inasmuch as the Mall could not have
formed its own REIT (R 4545 at 1123-24), Fairfax had to make the decision in January
1994 of how to proceed. However, if the Smiths would have given their consent, then
the Smiths suffered no damages. If the Smiths would have refused consent, then the
Mall would have been lost to foreclosure, so again they prove no damages.
8

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
The District Court erred in its rulings on punitive damages in several ways. First,

the District Court should not have permitted the issue of punitive damages to go to the
jury. Second, even if it correctly allowed punitive damages to go to the jury, the District
Court committed clear error in permitting the jury to include prejudgment interest in
compensatory damages and in failing to analyze or reduce the excessiveness of the
punitive damages award under the Crookston I factors. These errors should be corrected
by this Court under its de novo review of the punitive damage award.
A.

De Novo Review of the Punitive Damage Award Is Required.

The Smiths argue that Fairfax made no due process challenge to punitive damages,
precluding de novo review. (Smiths' Br. at 23, 29-33.) To the contrary, Fairfax has
challenged the constitutionality of the punitive damages.10 (Fairfax Br. at 45 n.39 ("The
same conclusion is directed by federal law[] [ujnder the three guideposts for federal due
process analysis"); see also id. at 2, 35, 36-37 (citing federal due process cases); id. at 36
n.35, 39, 44 (invoking "due process" or "constitutional" principles).) In any event, this
Court clearly "adopt[ed] the de novo standard for reviewing jury and trial court
conclusions under the Crookston I factors," even when evaluating non-constitutional

The Smiths make much of Fairfax's failure to set out the text of the due process clause
on page three of its brief. (Smiths' Br. at 29.) Fairfax did not quote the text of the due
process clause in the introductory portion of its brief because "interpretation" of the
constitutional text is not at issue in this case, as opposed to the relevant case law
thereunder (such as Campbell). Moreover, as the Smiths concede, it is the argument
rather than the preliminary sections in a brief that determines whether an issue has been
raised. (Smiths' Br. at 30 n.7 (citing Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 2001 UT
89, n.8).)
9

challenges. Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89, ^[13, Utah Adv.
Rep. 44, cert, granted, 122 S. Ct. 2326 (2001); see also id.,ffi[15, 22. n
B.

There Was No Evidence Justifying any Award of Punitive Damages.

Regardless of the standard of review, there was no evidence of any conduct that
would justify the submission of the issue of punitive damages to the jury. Fairfax
actually and reasonably believed the REIT to have been the only alternative to
foreclosure, and Fairfax further relied on outside legal and financial advisors throughout
the REIT process, so that Fairfax did not act recklessly or with malice.
1.

Fairfax Believed It Had No Alternative to the REIT.

Even if the Smiths were correct that a buyer would have materialized somehow in
early 1994, it was undisputed that Fairfax actually believed that to avoid foreclosure there
was no alternative to the REIT. (R 4545 at 1088-89, 1097, 1235; 4550 at 1923.)
Fairfax's belief (right or wrong) was reasonable because it had tried to refinance or sell
the Mall for nearly five years using its own contacts and two national brokers. It was told
by the second broker that he had "exhausted" his efforts with no one interested (despite
his every motive to successfully market the Mall to earn a commission). (R 4548 at
1603-04.) Fairfax so informed the Smiths, who failed to propose any reasonable

11

In Campbell, this Court separately evaluated the punitive damages under federal due
process standards and under state law, but still used de novo review for the state-law
challenge, which was under Crookston I rather than the Utah Constitution. Id. at n.8
(Court did not consider the Utah Constitution). In addition, this Court has always
reviewed the seventh Crookston I factor (ratio of damages) for "correctness." Id. at
1113.
10

alternative to the REIT. The Smiths' brief (and the District Court's findings) are
inexplicably silent on this key issue of Fairfax's intent.
2.

Fairfax Did Not Contribute the Mall to the REIT for any
Allegedly Improper Benefit for Itself.

The Smiths repeatedly argue that the "real reason" the Mall was contributed to the
REIT was for John Price's personal benefit. (Smiths' Br., UK 6, 15 at 7-8, 15-16, 24, 33,
36, 40, 42.) But the Smiths' argument is negated by two undisputed facts:
•

Fairfax could have gone ahead with the REIT for the over seventy other properties
without the Mall—although to the detriment of the Partnerships.

•

Price would have received the same personal benefits (or even more) from the
REIT if the Mall had not been contributed to the REIT.

(Fairfax Br. at 9 n.14.) Since the REIT could have proceeded without the Mall and since
Price would have received essentially the same (if not greater) benefit if the Mall had not
been contributed to the REIT, Fairfax's decision to contribute the Mall to the REIT could
not have been influenced by any non-Partnership benefits to Price—there were no
additional personal benefits for him to receive.

It was undisputed that the Partnership

benefits were shared proportionately with (and in fact disproportionately in favor of) the
Smiths. The District Court's findings did not attribute the REIT decision to alleged self-

The Smiths suggest that Fairfax did not want to sell the Mall because of "major adverse
tax consequences" of a sale due to Price's negative capital account in the Partnerships.
(Smiths' Br. at 7, 10, 15, 36, 40.) However, aside from the fact that the REIT also
avoided similar tax problems for themselves as well, the Smiths simply do not respond
to the undisputed evidence at trial that "such a sale probably would not have resulted in
the mentioned tax consequences," or that such tax consequences were not in fact
"considerations" during the attempted sale of the Mall. (Fairfax Br. at 6 n.9 (citing R
4550 at 1989, 2012).)
li

interest, and the evidence fails to support the Smiths' characterization of Fairfax's alleged
motives. Price's personal benefit from contribution of numerous non-Partnership
properties to the REIT is simply irrelevant to this case.
3.

Fairfax Relied on the Advice of Counsel in the REIT Process.

The Smiths assert as "core" issues that their consent to the REIT was required and
that the Mall had to be appraised. (Smiths' Br. at 3, 12.) Yet there is no dispute that
Fairfax was advised by competent legal counsel and REIT experts on the consent,
valuation, and disclosure issues. (Fairfax Br. at 9-11 (citations).) Whether or not the
advice obtained by Fairfax was correct, in relying on that advice Fairfax did not act
maliciously or wrongfully. (Fairfax Br. at 29 (citing, inter alia, Calhoun v. Universal
Credit Co., 146 P.2d 284, 288 (Utah 1944) (honest belief that conduct was lawful
precludes punitive damages even if belief was mistaken)).) The Smiths' assertion
(without citation) that advice of counsel is "irrelevant" (id. at 38) is contrary to Utah law.
The Smiths argue (without any citation tc the record) that Fairfax's reliance on
advice of counsel lacks "foundation" (whatever that means) and allegedly did not address
Fairfax's duties to the Smiths as a general partner. (Smiths' Br., ^j 18 at 18, 25. 33, 38.)
The Smiths are wrong. The record specifically discloses that Fairfax was advised by
counsel that it could not discuss REIT specifics with the Smiths prior to that time because
Mrs. Smith was an "unaccredited" investor under securities laws, that counsel evaluated
the Partnership Agreements in advising Fairfax on whether consent was required, and,
more importantly, that Fairfax was relying on these experts to advise it on how to
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discharge its fiduciary duties in this case. (R 4542 at 521; 4545 at 1084-86, 1103-05,
1114-15; 4550 at 1920, 1995-97.)
The District Court's findings fail to acknowledge that Fairfax obtained and relied
on legal advice on the "core" issues.
4.

Fairfax's January 1994 Disclosure of the Prospectus to the
Smiths Contradicts the Smiths' Claims of Concealment for Fear
of a Lawsuit.

The Smiths assert that Fairfax did not disclose information about the REIT prior to
its closing and that the District Court found "a substantial reason for the non-disclosure
was that Price 'did not want the Smiths to interfere by filing an adverse claim or potential
lawsuit prior to [the REIT closing on] January 21, 1994.'" (Smiths' Br. at 19 (quoting R
4495).) Not only was there was no evidence in the record to support this finding, the
undisputed evidence contradicts the Smiths' assertion. (Fairfax Br. at 13-14, nn. 19-20.)
The Smiths concede that Fairfax overnighted the REIT Prospectus to the Smiths on
January 13, 1994.

(Smiths' Br. at 14.) Yet, the Prospectus disclosed virtually all of the

facts that Fairfax was allegedly keeping "secret" from the Smiths—including the
contribution of all of the Mall to the REIT, the method of valuation, the alleged "conflicts

There is evidence in the record, consisting of Smith's own testimony, that he actually
saw a "prospectus" as early as November/December 1993. (R 4540 at 295 (Smith told
Mendenhall on December 2, 1993, that "[h]ere you organized a REIT, and part of the
purpose, as I understand it from the prospectus, was you were going to raise some
money to buy out [Cottonwood Mall] Partners") (discussing Exhibit 66, emphasis
added).) In any event, the Smiths cannot deny that they knew the REIT would in fact
go forward with the Mall prior to the REIT's closing—Smith received a personal
guaranty of the new debt and was told to sign it by the time of the REIT closing on
January 21, 1994, which Smith did. (Exs. 72, 74, 75.)
13

of interest," and John Price's benefit from the REIT.14 (P-71 at 3, 44-45, 90.) Thus, one
week prior to the REIT closing, the Smiths had all relevant information about the REIT,
including (contrary to their assertion and the District Court's findings) the agreed
contribution of the Mall to the REIT, If Fairfax had been allegedly motivated to conceal
facts to avoid a lawsuit prior to January 21, 1994, it would not have sent the Prospectus to
the Smiths prior to the REIT closing. Neither the Smiths' brief nor the District Court's
findings acknowledges the impact of Fairfax's disclosure of the Prospectus to the Smiths
on their allegations and findings of nondisclosure.
5.

Fairfax Did Not Misallocate Tax Losses.

The Smiths assert—without any supporting evidence—that the allocation of
Partnership losses for tax purposes was "deceitful and dishonest misconduct." (Smiths'
Br. at 9, 24, 36.) However, it was undisputed that the losses were allocated by an outside
accountant to comply with changes in the tax laws in 1991. (R 4547 at 1537-39, 155256, 1576, 1580.) Indeed, the District Court rejected the Smiths' argument on this point
and struck this allegation from its findings—a fact the Smiths do not mention. (R 4510
(ruling); R 4394; Fairfax Br. at 21 n.32.)
6.

Fairfax Did Not "Cook Its Books."
a.

The Partnership Books Were Not Cooked.

The Smiths also contend that Fairfax "cooked the Partnership books." (Smiths'
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Ironically, while ignoring the facts disclosed in the Prospectus, the Smiths nevertheless
repeatedly rely on the Prospectus to prove Fairfax's alleged self-dealing. (Smiths' Br.
at 12, 14-16.)
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Br. at 16, 24, 39-40, 43, 47.) However, it is unclear what the Smiths mean by that
pejorative phrase because even the Smiths' own expert, Merrill Norman, made no such
claim after his thorough review of the Partnership books. (See also R 4548 at 1667, 1725
(fraud examiner found no evidence of "cooked books").)
b.

The March 1994 Letter Was Not Malicious.

The Smiths use the phrase "cooked books" to characterize the March 8, 1994 letter
as "intentionally deceitful, dishonest," "bogus" and a "malicious . .. attempt... to
intimidate and coerce" the Smiths. (Smiths' Br., ^ 16 at 16, 24, 39, 41; Special Findings
at R 4494-95 (bullet points 5, 7-8).) The Smiths assert that this letter is their "most
important[]" punitive damages evidence on appeal. (Smiths' Br. at 24; see also Fairfax
Br. at 17 n.25.) That assertion reveals the frailty of their punitive damages claim.
There is no question that (as with almost any calculation) the various REIT
computations (December 1993, January 1994, and the two in March 1994) can be
confusing. (Fairfax Br. at 16 n.24, 17 n.26.) Notwithstanding the potential confusion,
the March 1994 letter does not support (but actually negates) a finding of malice by
Fairfax. It was undisputed that a strict REIT valuation (using the methodology disclosed
to the Smiths in December 1993) would have resulted in an allocation to the Smiths of
1,319 shares worth $23,000. However, Price personally contributed an additional 12,000
shares to the Partnerships at the REIT closing (more than doubling the Partnerships'
shares). The Smiths argue that an accurate accounting would have disclosed that Price's
contribution would have increased their 15% interest to 3,119 shares, worth $55,000.
(Smiths' Br. at 16-17 ("Undisclosed by Price at the time was the fact that. . . [the]
15

Smiths' 15% interest was . . . $54,582.50"); Fairfax Br. at 12-13, 16 n.24.) However, the
Smiths concede that Fairfax told them in January 1994 that their allocation was 13,319
shares (worth $233,000) and the March 1994 letter disclosed two computations of even
higher value (between $236,000 and $254,000), which included the immediate,,
preferential repayment of their capital call. l j The Smiths misleadingly focus on one
component of the calculation (the 352 shares in the shares/cash offer) to the exclusion of
the fact that the total value of the offer was almost five times higher than what the Smiths
claim was their entitlement—and more than all of the Partnerships' original allocation
under a strict REIT accounting. While Fairfax obviously could have communicated more
clearly in its attempt to resolve the Smiths' concerns, it is undisputed that Fairfax tried to
favor the Smiths preferentially to its own disadvantage. This letter, which was sent after
the REIT decision and merely explained its consequences, does not show malice, but
rather that, as the REIT expert testified, Price went "overboard" to benefit the Smiths.
(Fairfax Br. at 17.)
c.

The Other Accounting Issues Raised by the Smiths
Involve No Damage and Do Not Show Malice.

The Smiths raise other accounting issues to in an attempt to demonstrate Fairfax's
alleged malice, but, significantly, they do not ever claim damages therefor. The Smiths
charge that Fairfax's use of a single bank account was a "brazen and reckless breach[] of
its fiduciary trust," justifying punitive damages. (Smiths' Br. at 8-9, 24, 35.) But Fairfax

1:>

The offer was "preferential" to the Smiths because it would be paid ahead of Fairfax's
capital call.
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told the Smiths of this practice in 1991 (to which they raised no objection), and the
testimony was that the practice benefited the Partnerships. (Fairfax Br. at 19, 33-34).
Next, the Smiths assert that Fairfax made "secret" loans to the Partnerships. (Smiths' Br.
at 24, 36.) This contention ignores the undisputed fact that it was Fairfax that told Smith
about the loans (and the treatment of interest thereon). (Fairfax Br. at 6 n.8.) Finally, the
Smiths assert that the payment of a 5% rather than 3.9% management fee was
"dishonest." (Smiths' Br. at 9, 24, 36, 43.) However, since the Partnership Agreements
provided that the management fee could be either 3.9 or 5.0 % depending on the
circumstances, if it was a mistake, it was on its face an honest mistake. (Fairfax Br. at
19.) In any event, in December 1993 Fairfax provided the Smiths with audited financial
information that clearly disclosed the management fee it had charged in 1990 through
1992, thereby negating any allegation that Fairfax was trying to hide its fees. (Ex. 65 at
2.) Consequently, these accounting practices (whether right or wrong) do not show
malice or nondisclosure for the purposes of punitive damages.
7.

Mr, Price's Testimony Was Not Relevant to Punitive Damages.

The Smiths strenuously argue that the individual testimony of John Price was the
"hallmark" of the trial, "a bright line" supporting punitive damages that demonstrated
"arrogance, pomposity and indifference" because Mr. Price could not answer Mr.
Campbell's questions. (Smiths' Br. at 19-20, 42.) However, this examination of Mr.
Price demonstrates no malice on the part of Fairfax and does not support punitive
damages. The general partner and defendant was Fairfax, not John Price, who had only
"minimal involvement" with the Partnerships. The responsible Fairfax employees
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(Frazier and Mendenhall) in fact specifically answered the questions during the trial. (R
4542 at 568-73, 584, 589, 590, 593-96, 598-601, 609-10.) If Price's testimony is the
"bright-line" of punitive damages, then the Smiths' right to punitive damages is
extremely dim. The analytical clarity of de novo review by this Court should reject this
argument for what it was—an irrelevant means to inflame the jury.
C.

The Jury's Award of Punitive Damages Was Excessive under the
Crookston I Factors.

In this case, judgment was entered for $7,124,744.60 (the bulk of which was
punitive damages) on a dispute over whether the Smiths' Partnership interest should have
been valued at $410,000 (as found by the jury) or at between $230,000 and $255,000 (as
offered by Fairfax under the REIT in early 1994). Although the judgment was entered on
Special Findings asserting that the punitive damages were "within the zone of
reasonableness" (R 4497), there was no "detailed and reasoned articulation" as to why
this case was "unique" so as to justify a presumptively excessive punitive damage
award,16 see Campbell 2001 UT 89,ffi[15, 19. A de novo (or any other) review of the
seven factors announced by this Court in Crookston I demonstrates that the award of
punitive damages should be reversed or substantially reduced below the 3:1 guideline
established by this Court.

16

The Special Findings (which were drafted by the Smiths and adopted almost
unchanged by the District Court) focused almost exclusively on Fairfax's alleged
malice.
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1.

Fairfax's Relative Wealth

In response to Fairfax's specific arguments on wealth analyses in other cases, the
Smiths simply assert that Fairfax17 was wealthy (Smiths' Br. at 35), but make no attempt
to address Fairfax's net worth relative to the size of the punitive damages award. The
Smiths do not dispute that the punitive damage award in this case represented
approximately 15% of Fairfax's total wealth. By contrast the punitive damage awards in
Campbell and Crookston represented well less than 1% of the total wealth of those
defendants. There is simply no basis in this case for awarding punitive damages in a
relative amount that is over fifteen times higher than the amount awarded in Campbell.
2 - 3 . The Nature of Fairfax's Conduct and The Facts and
Circumstances Surrounding Fairfax's Conduct
In addressing these two factors, the Smiths substitute adjectives for analysis,
listing numerous examples of what they allege to be "sordid" and "reprehensible"
conduct. Each of the Smiths' specific conduct allegations is addressed above. As to the
central issue of the decision to convey the Mall to the REIT, the facts actually negate any
finding of malice. (See ILB., supra.)
4.

The Effect of Fairfax's Conduct on the Smiths and Others

The Smiths argue (without any citation to the record) that the issues in this case
have distressed them financially and emotionally, but they do not dispute that the results

The Smiths again blur the distinction between Fairfax and John Price, who was not a
party, and refer to "luxury" spending on an "executive jet" and the purchase of "art
work" as somehow being relevant to the relative wealth analysis. Such focus is
misguided because, as set forth above, the relevant inquiry is the relationship between
Fairfax's total wealth and the size of the punitive damages award.
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to them would have been at least equally disastrous if the Mall had been foreclosed upon.
In trying to avoid foreclosure, Fairfax was attempting to benefit all partners, including the
Smiths. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record that Fairfax's conduct affected any
parties other than Fairfax and the Smiths, and as noted below, no other partners
complained about the REIT. This factor does not justify an award of punitive damages
that exceeds the 3:1 guideline.18
5.

The Probability of Future Recurrences

Without any cited evidentiary basis or identification of other allegedly similar
situations, the Smiths allege that "Price is and will be a recidivist unless punitive
damages . . . are affirmed." (Smiths Br. at'43.) The Smiths' support for this assertion
seems to be that Fairfax has never admitted wrongdoing. Such reasoning, however,
would justify imposing punitive damages upon any party who actually defends an action
brought against it. Ihe situation here simply involves a valuation dispute in a one-time
transaction between parties who will likely never have anything to do with each other

' The Smiths assert that the "investing public"' was misled and injured by statements in
the Prospectus that Price "own[ed]" the Mall and by the "backed-into" capitalization
rate for the Mall. (Smiths' Br. at 43.) However, the Prospectus does not state that Price
"owned" the Mall, but rather accurately states that the properties were "currently owned
by privately organized partnerships" that would be contributed to the REIT "following
completion of the offering." (P-71 at 1, 6, 14, 15, 23, 25, 44.) In addition, the Smiths
offer no evidence that the Mall's capitalization rate (which was not disclosed in the
Prospectus) was material to the "investing public." To the contrary, the evidence was
undisputed that the investing public makes its decision based on the stream of income,
so that the capitalization rate of a particular mall would not be relevant to their
considerations—that is why REITs do not use appraisals. (R 4546 at 1293-95, 1305-06,
1328.) In any event, the REIT expert testified that the Mall's capitalization rate was set
in accordance with commonly accepted REIT standards. (R 4546 at 1294.)
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again. Moreover, no partner in any of the other thirty-eight partnerships that were
involved with the REIT has made any kind of complaint or allegation of wrongdoing.19
Nor is there any evidence in the record of any kind of wrongdoing on the part of Fairfax
or John Price even in transactions unrelated to the Mall. There was no evidence of any
pattern of wrongdoing, and the Smiths' answer of "who knows" (id. at 44) whether
Fairfax has ever engaged in other similar conduct is insufficient as a matter of law.
6.

The Relationship of the Parties

The Smiths argue that a large punitive damage award is appropriate because
Fairfax was a fiduciary. However, as Fairfax previously explained, the relevant analysis
turns on the specific facts of how that fiduciary relationship operated in this case.
(Fairfax Br. at 42.) It is undisputed that this was a dispute between educated and
experienced parties, and that Smith aggressively pursued his interest of obtaining a higher
pay-off. Moreover, it was undisputed that Fairfax tried to provide relevant information
(when permitted by law), and in fact favored the Smiths to its own disadvantage in the
REIT. Fairfax's mistakes, if any, do not justify excessive punitive damages.
7.

The Ratio of Punitive to Compensatory Damages

The Smiths argue that the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages in this case

The Smiths imply that one of Fairfax's representatives, Paul Mendenhall, scared
or threatened a potential witness. (Smiths' Br. at 44.) In fact, Mr. Mendenhall
merely told the witness that "the issue he was going to testify on had nothing to
do with the REIT." (R 4542 at 534.) The trial court sustained an objection to
Mr. Campbell's characterization of this comment as an effort to "intimidate" a
witness. Id. In addition, there is no evidence as to why the Smiths' potential
witness did not appear at trial.
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was only 3.3 to 1 (if both prejudgment interest and attorneys fees are included in
compensatory damages). (Smiths' Br. at 45.) The Smiths' argument that prejudgment
interest and/or attorneys fees should be included in the calculation is not only
unsupported, but contrary to Utah law on both points). See Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 967 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("Attorneys fees are more properly
considered costs and go on neither side of the scale when determining whether the
amount of punitive damages awarded cbear[s] a reasonable relation' to the amount of
general damages"); First Sec. Bank v. J.B J. Feedyards, 653 P.2d 591, 600 (Utah 1982)
(prejudgment interest cannot be added to punitive damages); Seminole Pipeline Co.,
Mapco Inc. v. Broad Leaf Partners, 979 S.W.2d 7^0, 739 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (including
interest in the ratio is equivalent to awarding interest on punitive damages).
Consequently, when properly calculated, the ratio in this case is at least 13:1 and
therefore presumptively excessive.20
The District Court failed to articulate why an award in excess of 3:1 was justified
by reference to the Crookston I factors. A de novo examination of all of the facts in this
case demonstrates that under the circumstances, this Court should totally eliminate or
significantly reduce the punitive damages awarded in this case.

Moreover, Fairfax told the Smiths in January 1994 that their REIT shares would be
worth $230,000 (and Fairfax subsequently offered even more in March 1994). If the
judgment is sustained, the Smiths must surrender their REIT shares, making the net
value of their recovery approximately 5180,000. Thus, the ratio of punitive damages to
the true economic effect of the compensatory damages is over 30:1.
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III.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS AWARD OF INTEREST.
A.

The Smiths Are Not Entitled to "Interest" as Damages.

The jury awarded $690,000 in "interest" on compensatory damages of $410,000,
which the District Court included in the Judgment. (Fairfax Br., tab A at 3-4, 5-6.) The
Smiths do not dispute that they are not entitled to interest under Utah "prejudgment
interest" rules, but they argue that "the time value of money [is] a substantive element of
damages in a breach of fiduciary claim." (Smiths' Br. at 52; see also id. at 50 n.14.)
However, Utah courts have evaluated interest in such cases under Utah's prejudgment
interest rules and not as a component of damages. See, e.g., Lefavi v. Bertoch, 2000 UT
App5,ffi|22-25,994P.2d817.
The Smiths argue that other jurisdictions allegedly award interest as substantive
damages for breach of fiduciary duty. (Smiths' Br. at 50-51.) However, the cited cases
actually awarded interest under the applicable jurisdiction's "prejudgment interest" rules,
which permit such interest in the fact finder's discretion.

(Fairfax Br. at 48 n.41

(quoting Wernick,22 Ryan, Jefferson, Rolf, McDermott, Michelson).) See also Josephson
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The Smiths' reliance on "restitution" authorities (Restatement, Ryan, and Rosenthal)
ignores that Utah rejects interest for equitable restitution. Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d
1089, 1097 (Utah 1991); Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 1999 UT App 355, ^24,
993 P.2d 222.
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The Smiths quote the decision of the Illinois Court of Appeals rather than the Illinois
Supreme Court. (Smiths' Br. at 50-51.) Although Fairfax discussed the higher court
ruling in its initial brief, it is instructive to note that the Smiths eliminated from the
lower appellate court decision the surrounding language inconsistent with their
attempted distinction: "It is well-settled that prejudgment interest is a form of
compensation, and that the decision whether to award such interest requires a balancing
of the equities between the parties under the circumstances. . . . We therefore remand
this cause with directions to award petitioners prejudgment interest at the prime rate."
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v. Marshall, 2002 WL 1315604 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2002) ("prejudgment interest"
awarded under New York statue in uaction[s] . . . at law"); Spangler v. Jones, 861 S.W.2d
392, 397-99 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) ("equitable prejudgment interest" permitted in trial
court's "discretion" in Texas in broad range of cases). Unlike Utah, these jurisdictions
merely employ discretionary and equitable prejudgment interest standards.
The Smiths ignore the seminal case of Fell v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 88 P.
1003 (Utah 1907), wherein this Court specifically criticized and rejected the Smiths'
distinction (between prejudgment interest and damages) that would "allow interest or not,
as in [the jury's] judgment may seem proper, as a pan of the damages." Id. at 1006. This
Court explained that a "fixed rule" is "a safer guide than the judgment of a few
individuals," whether the "court or jury," because any other rule "must lead to
uncertainty, and may tend to favoritism in its application." Id. The policies of full
compensation and deterrence (advanced by the Smiths in favor of its distinction) have
already been taken into account in the formulation of Utah's existing prejudgment
interest rules. Trail Mountain Coal Co. v. Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry, 921
P.2d 1365, 1370 (Utah 1996). This Court should follow existing law and deny
discretionary, equitable prejudgment interest in this case.
B.

The Jury's Award of Interest Was Clearly Excessive.

The benefit of Utah's prejudgment interest rules is illustrated by the jury's av/ard
of interest in this case, which exceeded by $92,779 the compounded interest figure put in

Estate of Wernick, 502 N.E.2d 1146, 1154 (111. Ct. App. 1986), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 535 N.E.2d 876, 888 (111. 1989).
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evidence by the Smiths at trial. (Smiths' Br. at 53.) No one knows how the jury reached
that figure, but the Smiths now speculate that the jury was awarding interest on its
$30,000 water contribution. The Smiths make no attempt to demonstrate or defend how
the jury could have permissibly calculated that amount of interest on the water rights.
In any event, as a matter of law, contributions to capital accounts, such as these water
rights (as opposed to capital calls), do not bear interest. (P-15 art. 4 ("No interest shall be
payable on any contributions to the capital of the Partnership"); P-45 (water rights
transferred in "consideration of a $30,000 increase in my capital account").
Consequently, the jury's damage award was clearly excessive and must be reduced. The
excessive interest, just as the excessive punitive damages, demonstrates that the jury was
motivated by passion or prejudice in this case.
CONCLUSION
The judgment should be reversed and this case should be remanded for entry of
judgment n.o.v. on (1) all claims because the REIT was the only alternative to save the
Mall, (2) all punitive damages claims because of the failure to establish willful misconduct,
and/or (3) all claims for interest. Alternatively, this Court should reduce the punitive
damages award to an appropriate amount or remand for a new trial.

The only evidence at trial was that the compounded interest rate used by the Smiths
was roughly the same as 10 percent simple interest. (R 4542 at 2163.) Consequently,
ten years of interest on $30,000 would be merely one third of the excess interest award,
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